STATter 911

Read entire NIOSH report

Watch raw video from DC Fire & EMS Department photographer Vito Maggiolo

For the first time there is a detailed public account of the actions of firefighters and command officers during an October 29, 2007 fire that injured four firefighters from the DC Fire & EMS Department. All four of the firefighters assigned to Engine 4 on that day are back to work, including the most seriously injured, Sgt. Michael Lacore.

NIOSH released its report on November 17 as part of its Firefighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program. The DC Fire & EMS Department also conducted its own internal investigation that has not been publicly released. Contacted recently by STATter 911, a spokesman indicated the release of the department's report is imminent.

Engine 4 was the fifth-due engine on a box-alarm assignment for a row house fire at 619 4th Street, NE at 3:17 PM. The NIOSH report describes the structure and burning Side D exposure this way:

The fire and exposure buildings were 2-story single family row house dwellings of ordinary wood construction. These houses were near the middle of 18 contiguous row houses. The roofs consisted of tar covering tin and plywood.

While the first arriving crews concentrated on the home where the fire began, Sgt. Lacore and his crew were assigned to the Side D exposure. It was on the second-floor of that home where the crew from Engine 4 found rapidly deteriorating conditions after initially knocking down the bulk of the fire. Here is the account from the NIOSH report:

... E4’s crew (victims 1, 2, 3, and 4) made preparations to enter into the front of the exposure building. At 1526 hours victim #1 (Officer/Sergeant) entered the front door of the exposure building and walked halfway through the first floor, checking fire conditions (see Diagram 2). He encountered light smoke and no fire, and at that point, turned back to the stairwell and went upstairs. Victim #4 (lineman/nozzle man) had entered the front of the building with the 1 ½ inch line and saw light to moderate smoke on the 1st floor with about 8 feet visibility. He proceeded up the stairwell to the top of the stairwell landing with victim # 2 backing him up on the hose line. Victim #3 had also advanced up the stairwell to the second floor where he and the other victims observed fire in the back of the building on side-C. At 1527 hours, victim #1 reached the second floor, joined the other fire fighters, and began directing fire fighting operations and pulling ceiling. The hose line was advanced down the hallway toward the back of the building (see Diagram 3), and at 1528 hours, victim #4 hit the fire in the back room and knocked it down. Visibility improved to the point where the victims could see to the rear porch on the exterior of the building on side-C. During this time, a fire fighter from E10 was hitting the fire through the window of the exposure building on the 1st floor of side-C. Shortly thereafter, the rear door on side-C of the 1st floor of the exposure building was kicked open by an Officer (see photographs 1, 2, and 3), and the fire grew in intensity.

Victim #3 performed a quick search for occupants in a room in the front of the building, and no occupants were found. He then returned to the landing where he observed a glow in the stairwell from the fire on the 1st floor. Simultaneously, victim #2 noticed fire behind him coming up the stairwell from the first floor and from the back wall area on side-C. At about 1530 hours victim #1 was near a window on the back wall of side-C looking for an escape route. The fire erupted up the outside wall of the exposure building and through the window burning the victim. He made a radio transmission but the transmission was unintelligible.

Victim #3 yelled to victim #2 that fire was coming up the stairwell. Victim #1, who was later described by the other victims as being engulfed in flames, ran past them down the stairwell to the outside of the building. Victims #2 and #3 also ran down the stairwell through the flames to the outside. Victim #4 continued to spray water on the fire as the others exited. At 1531 hours, the Officer from E18 called a Mayday when he en-countered a fire fighter in distress at the bottom of the stairwell on the first floor of the exposure building. At about 1533 hours, victim #4 ran down the stairwell to the first floor where he was assisted out of the building by another fire fighter from T10. The victims were treated for their burn injuries at the scene and then transported by ambulance to nearby hospitals.

At 1534 hours, a Chief Officer, who had arrived on the fireground earlier but had not reported in, radioed the Incident Commander (IC) for permission for a fire fighter to hit the fire on side-C of the exposure building. Although the Chief did not get authorization from the IC, he ordered the fire fighter to hit the fire on side-C.

Here are some of the conclusions from NIOSH investigators:

• ensure adequate size-up, including in exposure buildings, to reduce the risk of fire fighters being trapped
• ensure that fire fighters are trained on the hazards of operating on the floor above the fire without a charged hoseline, and to follow associated standard operating guidelines (SOGs)
• ensure ventilation is coordinated with the interior attack
• provide fire fighters with station/work uniforms (e.g., pants and shirts) that are compliant with NFPA 1975 and ensure the use and proper care of these garments
• ensure that fire fighters are trained on initiating Mayday radio transmissions immediately when they are in distress, and/or become lost or trapped

NIOSH Caption with the above photo: Photo 1. Fire fighter attacking fire through a rear window from the back porch area on side-C of exposure building at approximately 1528 hours; illustrates fire extending inward.

# posted by Dave Statter @ 1:23 PM