Sunday, May 4, 2008
One MD FF released, 2 in fair condition at burn unit. New details and pictures on the collapse and the self-rescue by three firefighters.
Montgomery County Fire & Rescue Service photos of Captain/Paramedic R. Dwayne Dutrow (top) and Firefighter/Paramedic James Heikka (middle), Firefighter/Rescuer Mark Mechlin (bottom)
Watch 9NEWS NOW report from Sunday, 11:00 PM
Watch 9NEWS NOW report from Monday, 7:00 PM
Download fireground audio of 3-alarm fire with mayday at 12,819 Twinbrook Parkway
On Sunday, Captain R. Dwayne Dutrow was taken out of ICU, but remains in the Burn Unit at the Washington Hospital Center. Captain Dutrow is the most seriously injured of the three firefighters hurt while fighting a fire in Rockville, Maryland early Saturday morning.
The 38-year-old Dutrow is a 17-year veteran of the Montgomery County Fire & Rescue Service. He is suffering from burns to his arms, legs, face and hands, as well as possible internal and orthopedic injuries.
Dutrow, along with Firefighter James Heikka and Firefighter Mark Mechlin, fell from the top floor to the middle floor of a burning garden-apartment building after what is being described as a catastrophic floor collapse. Both Captain Dutrow and Firefighter Heikka were then further injured after escaping through a window to the ground, approximately 14-feet below.
Firefighter Heikka is 31 and an 8-year member of the department. He has burns to the arm and leg, and facial lacerations. Firefighter Mechlin is 23 and has been on the job for just a year. His injuries are considered less serious, with a leg burn (Update: As of 3:30 PM, Monday, FF Mechlin has been released from the hospital. Captain Dutrow and FF Heikka are in fair condition.)
Timothy Moran. Courtesy Philip Sandoe.
Killed in the fire is 50-year-old Timothy Moran. Moran's body was found in the same apartment where the firefighters landed. Montgomery County investigators say the fire started in that apartment and is believed to be accidental. According to Moran's family he is the son of a former firefighter from Silver Spring, Charles K. Moran. The family has asked that donations be made in the names of the injured firefighters to HEROES, Inc.
On Sunday evening, STATter 911 talked with Montgomery County Fire & Rescue Service spokesman Pete Piringer who provided new details about the events leading up to the firefighters' injuries. Piringer says all of the information is preliminary and is based on brief talks he had with the firefighters, command officers and investigators.
Side A of 12,819 Twinbrook Parkway
Piringer says the three injured firefighters were part of Engine 723, the first arriving engine company. The fire was reported just before 1:00 AM and the first units were presented with a number of occupants who were still in the building.
12,819 Twinbrook Parkway is a garden-apartment building believed to have been built in the 1960s. It is at one end of a group of three attached buildings. The building is on a slope showing two floors in the front and three in the rear. There are ten apartments with two on the terrace level, four on the first floor (apartments 101-104) and four on the second floor (apartments 201-204).
According to Piringer, Captain Dutrow led his crew with an attack line, up the interior stairway on Side A into apartment 203. Apartment 203 is essentially Quadrant C on the top floor. While attacking the fire, Piringer says the floor near the bedroom suddenly collapsed spilling all three firefighters into the fire below in apartment 103.
Piringer says this was not a small hole in the floor, but a large section of the floor that gave way.
Engine 723's crew took a line into apartment 203, the door straight-ahead at the top of the stairs
STATter 911 talked to neighbors who were on Side C at the time of the collapse. They report a sudden increase in fire coming from apartment 103 and possibly 203. A moment later they saw two firefighters appear at a Side C window on the middle level with a great deal of fire around them.
The witnesses describe the first firefighter as rolling over the window sill to the ground, about 14-feet below. The second firefighter was having a more difficult time getting out of the window and apparently fell head first to the ground.
Piringer says that description is consistent with what he has heard, so far, about the escape from the flames by Captain Dutrow and Firefighter Heikka.
Witnesses say Captain Dutrow and Firefighter Heikka exited through the now boarded up window on the middle level, to the left of the balcony.
Firefighter Mechlin was still in the burning apartment. According to Piringer he landed with the hose still in his hands and a large piece of furniture on top of him. While trapped, Mechlin tried to spray water in the direction of the other two firefighters who he could hear toward the window. Because of the way he was trapped Mechlin could not reach his radio, but a mayday had already been called.
Mechlin was soon able to free himself. At about the same time he felt water spraying from the rapid intervention team assigned to find him. Piringer says Mechlin saw a light from one of the firefighters and made his way to the crew.
Montgomery County Fire & Rescue Service photo of collapse area showing hose that was in Firefighter Mechlin's hands and the furniture that trapped himDespite being exposed to the fire the longest, Mechlin's injuries are less severe. Piringer says one theory is that the piece of furniture helped shield him from the fire.
Piringer says the dire situation had all three men thinking they may have fought their last fire, but in the end their training, experience and a little luck pulled them through.
A wider view of Side C at 12,819 Twinbrook Parkway
: May 5, 2008 7:35 AM I am so glad know one was killed. We are praying for their recovery
: May 5, 2008 10:20 AM : May 5, 2008 10:21 AM : May 5, 2008 12:06 PM : May 5, 2008 2:46 PM At first listen the IC did an excellent job, he was calm, in control, and called a 2nd alarm quickly. However, after listening again and using the details Dave has posted here, it appears the IC made what could have almost been a fatal mistake. He directed 1st arriving Engine 723 to the second floor (where they went above the fire but it was really the 3rd floor) and also E-718 & E-703 to the 3rd floor. So while IC thought he was sending E-723 to the main fire floor he actually sent them above it and there was no one sent to put out the main body of fire on the second floor (apt 103)! I believe this confusion probably directly led to how this incident unfolded.
It was radioed early on that it was a three story, but I can understand how E-723 would have tunnel vision and just be trying to complete their assignment, not catch the floor discrepancy and just go to the second floor on his side. I think you probably have to fault either the IC or the A side BC for not figuring it out sooner.
There were other problems with the IC once the mayday was called, such as getting some engine companies confused, but considering the stress of the mayday that is understandable. And while it was great that he called for a "LUNAR" twice as soon as the mayday was called, he didn't really follow back up with it and try again after he wasn't responded to. Instead he called for a helicopter, which was good, but I think it probably distracted him and could have waited a minute or two. Locating a missing man and directing water/rescue to the location has to be job one. Additionally the RIT team was called to the rear of the structure when really except for the medics, the rescue attempt should have been launched from Side A where the stairs are.
However, with all that was happening, overall the crews did an excellent job, making saves and preventing the entire building from burning down. With that much fire, unfortunately, I'm sure the victim was unsavable. Also many of the radio transmissions were excellent (including the IC) and especially the RIT captain in a difficult situation.
Yes Monday morning quarterbacking but this is a really good learning incident that we all can learn from. Bottom line IMHO, IC should have drove his vehicle around to side A and I think that would have made all the difference.
Lesson learned-try to never command an incident from side C unless absolutely necessary and as soon as someone realizes there are floor #'s that can be mistaken from different sides, it should be broadcast. Truck co's should look out for this as often from the roof they have the best view to observe this. And as the above party mentions, preplanning is important.
Our thoughts are with you guys. We're praying for a safe and speedy recovery.
: May 6, 2008 9:17 AM Just as your comment came in, I was writing the same thought to a friend of mine.
What would have been the outcome if they were in apartment 103 instead of 203?
Those are the things of fate and luck. I recall working the radio on an old school fire in Oxon Hill. It went to a second alarm.
When I got back to the firehouse the next day I heard the story of two good friends of mine who were on the initial attack line heading up to the second floor to the large classroom that was off. Their line got kinked on the door at the top of the stairs. As they worked in the hallway on unkinking the line, a concrete slab that was part of the roof came crashing into the classroom. I went to the scene and saw it myself and it was clear they likely would have been dead or critically injured if it wasn't for the kink.
Statter
NJ Steve,
Based on your firm grasp of the "lingo" of today's fire service I believe that you are an EMT or possibly a firefighter. I do not believe that you have been in the position of being an IC on a major fire, nor do I feel that you have more than 3-4 years in the service. I feel strongly that you have not been to those apartments as often as the IC (and all the boys from 23B). I say this b/c if you knew the layout you would know that side A is a grassy common area between the apartments, and even with the stairs is not the most affective place to set up command. A good command officer wants to be able to see as much of the scene as possible, and have good command officers on the other sides, and inside a fire building he can trust to keep him updated. This was all there that evening. Unit 2 had the best view of the situation unfolding from side C, and that is where I feel he should have been.
Also you mention that he was requesting the helicopter, prior to receiving the LUNAR message from FF Mechlin. This was due to the fact that the 30 seconds between the request for the LUNAR, and the lack of response indicated that FF Mechlin was probably separated from his radio (which was the case). So at the time he had not received a response from one crew member, and he had two others laying badly hurt on the lawn about 30-50 feet from him. He probably realized that this was the perfect time to ensure that his men were able to get the best treatment and rapid transport available (to which we all thank MSP and USPP).
I have to say that I was on this call on the initial alarm, and I have been on some considerable cluster****s in the past here in Montgomery County, but this was not one of them! Once again we got lucky, and we know that, but there is more to it than just being lucky. All the luck in the world has not prevented us from having a LODD for as long as we have gone without one. We are a well trained highly effective fire service, and I think shortly after 1 am May 3, 2008 that showed again.
God Bless, and my prayers are with Dwayne and all the boys from 23B!
thatguy51
: May 6, 2008 10:49 AM Here in Montgomery County, we complain like in many jurisdictions about being assigned to the RIG, but early Saturday morning it once again became apparent why it is so important to be as well trained as we are. I know many station officers, both career and volunteer reviewed the policies and procedures on the RIG with their crews over the weekend and early this week, and I hope it just continues to illustrate the point of why this is as important as we all know it is.
: May 6, 2008 10:52 AM Stay Safe
Send these men and the members of MCFRS all of your thoughts and support.....remember their family and the long re hab ahead....
S. Pennington
NAFFVN
care for the caregivers
firefighterveteran.com/
: May 6, 2008 11:36 AM As for changing the numbering system back,how about taking something new and studying it, learning it, practicing it and executing it the way it supposed to be. The old numbering system is not coming back. Its a new tool, if its too difficult to use, its time to retire or stop volunteering.
: May 6, 2008 12:15 PM 2) The rapid intervention team deployed a hoseline which helped the trapped firefighter survive. Many teams stand at the ready with a variety of rescue equipment at their side. We have recently been discussing the addition of a "charged hoseline" at the ready for the Rapid Intervention Team(s). If this was the case in MD. Fantastic, I think it lends credence to our change in procedure. Quite often when FFs need to be rescued it is due to rapid fire spread, flashover,or some other catastrophic event causing rapid fire spread at the IMMEDIATE need for a charged hoseline.
Get well guys!
Jim Gallagher King of Prussia, PA
: May 6, 2008 12:20 PM : May 6, 2008 2:50 PM : May 6, 2008 10:13 PM Dave S & Stevel
Yes, that is one possible scenario that the ceiling could come down and have trapped them, but I think it is much more likely that with entry into Apt 103 made 2 to 3 minutes sooner that wouldn't have happened due to less burn time, and the incident would have unfolded like a usual fire.
thatguy51 & S Buck
I never said the job was a cluster f*** or that I could do better. Never did I suggest your department isn't well trained, etc. Saving the majority of that building, among the rescues made and the equipment you rapidly got on scene proves you're are a very competent department. But with The Secret List among others all praising the IC, I thought maybe some other issues should be mentioned.
51, you're right I guessed the side A layout incorrectly, but if you want to find no fault with the IC, fine, but do you also think assigning E-703 and E-718 to deploy "at least 2" hose" to attack the fire on the 3rd floor (assumably via a ladder), with still uncontrolled fire, was the best attack method to the 3rd floor? Well, I guess if you established a CP on the C side and wanted to keep an eye on your men you might want to do that. Personally, most of the FFs I know prefer to use the stairs.
And how would you correct the mistake of confusing the floor numbers, or would you just leave that to chance of not happening again despite having an experienced IC making the mistake? Do you have any lessons learned to share or like Charleston would you do nothing different?
There are other issues I noticed, but with a report hopefully coming out, I'll wait before saying more. When I posted, I really didn't expect to see any report and I thought there was things that could be immediately learned from the job other than just admiring how cool the IC stayed. And once the men recover, I'd like to see if Capt Dutrow and his crew find the IC blameless or not?
Yes, IMHO I think the injuries were probably preventable (from starting in Apt 103), but yes mistakes and s**t does happen. But I think when they do it is better to learn from them then to overlook them. Once a mayday is called, it is incredibly hard to run an incident and while this one was better than most I have reviewed, I think it still had things that could have been improved and learned by others. The forthcoming Charleston report will be brutal. I don't expect that here, but there will be issues raised I'm sure.
Oh, and is Engine 723 and 231 one and the same, well I wouldn't have known that either, so maybe the chief didn't mix the rigs up if that terminology was common knowledge to everyone on the scene.
JG from PA you raise a lot of valid points. Some seem to think that when a mayday is called, clearing the channel, activating the RIT, and calling a LUNAR pretty much takes care of the ICs duties. But in an incident like this, it goes way beyond that, as the IC is critical to finding out where and what the problem is, and developing a plan on the fly to get resources and manpower such as hose line protection to the member trapped.
And finally, yes, the floor should not have completely given way 10 minutes after arrival. So much for the fire rating of sheetrock, etc. I'd love to see NIST get involved and try to explain it.
: May 11, 2008 6:57 AM Links to this post:
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